Study Guide

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Foreign Military Interventions

DISEC

Renato Llontop

Dear delegates,

First of all, thank you for being here and for choosing to experience this CarMUN at the Disarmament and International Security Committee. My name is Renato Llontop - though in the MUN field I might be recognized as "potato" - and as the former Secretary-General of the 2017 edition, I'm really pleased of returning to a place I call home.

Planning to major in International Relations with a minor in Economics, I took a gap year for building calmly an application process to colleges in the United States, Europe, and Asia. It has been a fruitful time in which I co-founded a Non-governmental organization named Pukutay dedicated to transform the tons of fog we have in Lima into water supplies for the most needed populations. If you would like to know a little bit more about this initiative, here's the link www.pukutay.org.

In regard to my MUN experience, I've been debating since 2015 and have attended more than 35 conferences as a delegate, director and/or Secretariat. I've debated in General Assemblies, Economic & Social Councils, Regional Bodies, and Specialized Agencies. However, if I need to be honest, more than the numbers what makes me remain in Model UN is the people I've had the pleasure to meet. Remember that each of you has something special to tell or to share in a conference, and that is something I really value.

Last year, I joined Peruvian Universities for expanding my horizons and participated in the Arctic Council at the Harvard National Model United Nations (HNMUN). This year, I've returned to PU in order to finish my MUN journey trying the most diplomatic conference at the college level: Harvard World Model United Nations - also known as the MUN Olympics. Being this the last time, I'll be directing a committee and my last year as a delegate, I would really like to thank everyone who has been part of my adventure. Part of the journey is the end, and I hope you can enjoy Model UN as much as I have during all these 5 years.

Yours in diplomacy,

Renato Josué Llontop Calosi
Director
Disarmament and International Security Committee

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

Foreign Military Interventions

According to Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, Foreign Military Interventions (FMIs) are events involving "the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute". In this way, it's important to bear in mind that the modern international system is founded on the premise that sovereign states have a right and duty to non-intervention - to be free from unwanted external involvement in their internal affairs. Yet, FMIs are considered double-edged weapons as states frequently rely on armed forces with various self-interested and humanitarian goals. While the international community has already agreed that Humanitarian Interventions are somehow legal, or at least legally justifiable, the issue with FMI lies with intervention done justified by the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" and/or the "Unable or Unwilling" Doctrine. In recent times, repeated humanitarian interventions since 1991 have confronted the idea of sovereign immunity in the name of protecting civilians from harm. This human security perspective on the use of force, grounded in the belief that the rights of people, not states, are the bedrock of a just and secure world, has found its voice in the concept that states have a responsibility to protect civilians within their jurisdiction.[1]

In this session of the Disarmament and International Security Committee, it would be up to delegates to determine whether FMIs promote democratization, cease internal armed conflicts, sustain longer-term peace & stability, and/or change socioeconomic circumstances in target countries.[2]

I. HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE:

When the United Nations Charter was ratified on 24 October 1945, it established the UN General Assembly as a forum for "cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security".[3] The General Assembly is composed of all 193 UN member states, all of which share equal voting rights, and a handful of non-voting observer states, including the Holy See and Palestine. Unlike the UN Security Council, which passes binding, directly actionable resolutions, the General Assembly passes unbinding resolutions recommending or advising action and policy, and is considered the "deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations".[4] Under the Charter, the General Assembly's duties include reviewing and assisting UN Security Council actions, appointing the UN Secretary-General and non-permanent members of the Security Council, approving the UN budget, and acting as the principal forum for international political cooperation.[5] The General Assembly convenes at the UN

Headquarters in New York for "regular" sessions every September, and "emergency" sessions ordered by the Secretary-General or voted on by the Security Council.[6]

United States' political intervention in Iraq
Retrived from:
https://kaosenlared.net/esta-irak-tras-la-muerte-sadd
am-hussein/

The Disarmament and International Security Committee is the first committee of the General Assembly, and manages "disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations, the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security… [and the] principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments".[7] DISEC focuses on issues related to global security, in its many shapes and forms, and drafts procedural guidelines for disarmament. DISEC also works alongside the other five organs of the General Assembly, particularly the Special, Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), to provide a global perspective on more localized threats to international peace and security. DISEC often functions alongside the UN Disarmament Commission, established in 1978 as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. The UNDC publishes annual advisory reports related to disarmament and weapon proliferation.[8] The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD), founded in 1979, plays a complementary role to DISEC, acting as a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for the international community. The CD was directly responsible for principal nuclear non-proliferation treaties of the later twentieth century, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Along with the CD, DISEC has played a critical role in facilitating major twentieth and twenty-first-century international security treaties and overseeing the implementation of disarmament protocols, in its advisory role to the Security Council.[9]

II. HISTORY OF THE TOPIC:

An explosion rips through the south tower of the World Trade Center as smoke billows from the north tower
(Robert Clark / Associated Press)

The events of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent military response by the United States and its allies raise some difficult issues in international law. Does an attack by a non-state terrorist group give rise to the right of self-defense as understood under international law? Under what circumstances was the Taliban

regime as the Afghan government itself a legitimate target for military action under the self-defense doctrine? To what extent was the United States entitled to dictate the terms by which the Taliban regime should act before the military action would cease against it and Al Qaeda bases on Afghan soil?

Only the first issue can be answered—yes—with any degree of confidence. The others are clouded with uncertainty. To some extent this uncertainty reflects the shift of international law away from an emphasis on regulating relations between sovereign states (countries) towards having to incorporate the actions of non-state groups within the legal framework. Hence, before advancing into the next pages of this guide, we should clarify some terms that should be useful in your preparation for this conference.

First, the law of State Responsibility is the chapter of international law that concerns the breach by a State of one or more of its international obligations. Unlike national laws, wherein different rules often apply according to the source of the obligation breached (e.g., contract law, tort law, criminal law), international law does not concern itself with the source of the obligation that is breached; in principle the same rules apply to the breach of an obligation whether the source of the obligation is a treaty, customary international law, a unilateral declaration, or the judgment of an international court.

Second, the Use of Force has been a long-standing phenomenon in international relations and has been considered to be directly linked to the sovereignty of states. According to Article 2 (Clause 4) of the United Nations Charter, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." It is quite clear that the use of force is certainly prohibited in the view of territorial integrity and independence of member states including armed forces intervention. Thus, it is certain that the United Nations does not condone any form of reprisals, this is completely out of its purpose. The use of the term 'force' clearly indicates that the traditional perception on war and the modern definition are prohibited. The Charter only speaks of the use of force as legal or illegal, it does not recognize just and unjust wars, the former is a rule while the latter is an exemption.

Third, the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense in case of an armed attack is only allowed until the UN Security Council has intervened. The steps taken by members in the exercise of self-defense must be reported to the Security Council and must not in any way affect the mandate of the Council under the current Charter. According to Article 51 of UN Charter, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to

maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security". The right to self-defense is still provided for in customary international law, and has also been observed that an irregular forceful attack can prompt the use of force as in the case of 9/11 attacks where the Security Council allowed the USA to use force against the terrorists.

With the guidelines above mentioned, now it will be important to further discuss the transcendence of FMI. Military interventions have been part of our history since ancient times. After the Paleolithic period, especially when civilizations started to thrive, a cycle of conquest among themselves (e.g. Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians, etc.) started to take an important stance in the history of humanity. Nonetheless, it wasn't until civilizations evolved into empires that the military capability reached its peak as an imminent characteristic. From that point onwards, we can look back on how Alexander the Great and his Macedonian Empire conquered the Persians in 331 B.C.E., winning important battles in Anatolia, Babylon, Mesopotamia, Persepolis, Syria, among others. The main goal of Alexander and his father, Philip, was to unite both Greek and Macedonian city-states into a military alliance. Once it worked, they never thought that an alliance

of such a type could have repercussions in other sectors. Greek language, art, and architecture became commonplace throughout the ancient Middle East and later it was this Hellenistic culture the one which influenced the rise of the Roman Empire. In regards to the above mentioned, we can conclude that military interventions are more than just weapons: 1) They can have political purposes by making a state a perfect player in a geographical area, 2) They can have an economic purpose by interconnecting more territories in their commercial exchanges and 3) They can have social purposes by promoting a nation's culture from a local level into a global one.

Calvin Coolidge, 30th US President, at the signing of the Kellogg - Briand Pact, 1928
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If of historical events we need to inform, we should definitely start with the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which forbids FMI as a resort to solve controversies. The agreement promised not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever

nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them." Parties failing to abide by this promise "should be denied of the benefits furnished by this treaty." It was signed by Germany, France, and the United States on August 27, 1928, and by most other nations soon after. Overall, the Kellogg–Briand Pact did not live up to its aim of ending war or stopping the rise of militarism, and in this sense, it made no immediate contribution to international peace and proved to be ineffective in the years to come. Moreover, the pact erased the legal distinction between war and peace because the signatories, having renounced the use of war, began to wage wars without declaring them as in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939, and the German and Soviet Union invasions of Poland. Nevertheless, the pact is an important multilateral treaty because, in addition to binding the particular nations that signed it, it has also served as one of the legal bases establishing the international norms that the threat or use of military force in contravention of international law, as well as the territorial acquisitions resulting from it, are unlawful.

Another series of events which were preludes to the current FMIs, are the World Wars. The system of alliances established new parameters in the military field and became the first time in which foreign military forces were deployed from several countries around the world. But from both wars, the one who had the greatest impact in the long term was World War II. Not only the creation of the United

Nations in 1945 was a major consequence, but most importantly for the disruptiveness of this committee, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 shifted the way we saw military interventions forever.

Once considered an aberration in international affairs, humanitarian interventions became a compelling foreign policy issue. During the Cold War, they were on the front line of debates about when to use military force; it presented a fundamental challenge to state sovereignty; it radically influenced the way humanitarian aid organizations and military organizations worked; it was a matter of life or death for thousands of people. Since the mid-20th century onwards, Foreign Military Interventions proliferated in several regions of the world with the excuse of appealing humanitarian necessities in developing nations. For example, let's take India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. Following the electoral victory in East Pakistan of the independence-minded Awami League, the Pakistani Army killed over 1 million people and drove millions more into India. Indian Government representatives at the UN initially justified their military response in part on humanitarian grounds. They withdrew that justification, however, and relied on a national security argument when other governments objected that the principles of sovereignty and noninterference should take precedence. Another example, when in 1979 Viet Nam overthrew Pol Pot in Cambodia and Tanzania overthrew Idi Amin in Uganda. Although the two dictators were among the

most atrociously brutal in the 20th century, and both actions have been cited subsequently (years later) as examples of intervention with positive humanitarian results, both governments justified their actions on national security grounds and shunned humanitarian arguments. Nonetheless, it was during the 1990s that the question of justifiable humanitarian intervention took on new urgency when states, the United Nations and regional multinational organizations repeatedly intervened to help people subject to human rights abuses and severe deprivation - Iraq (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1998) and East Timor (1999).[10]

In conclusion, as far as history has shown us, we can understand that humanitarian intervention is a short-term activity with limited political objectives. It is intended only to stop the worst suffering. It is not intended to establish a lasting peace or to put a new, or renewed, political system in place, although it can establish a basis for peace-building by creating an environment in which people can think about more than mere survival. Explicitly political objectives follow but are distinct from humanitarian objectives. This distinction becomes blurred when policymakers want an intervention to alleviate human suffering and promote a political resolution to the crisis, as UN-led operations were asked to do in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The difference between humanitarian and political objectives was more obvious in Kosovo and East Timor, where initial humanitarian operations quickly handed over to long-term political operations. In

brief, humanitarian intervention is meant to protect fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances; it is not meant directly to protect or promote civil and political rights. Delegates should put careful attention in this part as their governments may differ on which objectives are more important, either political or humanitarian.

III. CURRENT SITUATION:

In early 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Although the operation was not authorized, they reported their actions to the United Nations Security Council, which is why this intervention was completely legal and not sanctioned. The action sparked vehement disagreement over whether human rights and humanitarian concerns can ever be a legitimate cause of war.[11] UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized that it was time to address head-on the tension in the UN Charter.[12] He confronted the UN General Assembly in 1999 and again in 2000 with a startling challenge (by General Assembly standards) to 'forge unity' around basic principles of intervention in cases of extreme need: 'if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity? In essence, the problem is one of responsibility: in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale we have a responsibility to act.'[13] In response to the

challenge, Canada initiated the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which produced The Responsibility to Protect in 2001. The R2P emphasized that a duty inherent in state sovereignty is to safeguard the lives and livelihoods of civilians.[14] If that duty is not upheld, the commission argued, other governments, authorized by the UN, have the right to act, including to use military force as a last resort. The concept of states' responsibility to protect civilians drew sharp reactions from many governments, particularly in Asia and Latin America, which saw in it the legitimation of military intervention by strong states against weak ones. Their criticisms appeared to be borne out in 2003 when the United States of America tried to justify its invasion of Iraq in humanitarian terms after its initial justification—that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction—was proved false. Human rights organizations, however, forced the US Administration of President George W. Bush to back away from the claim when they exposed its absurdity, with reference to the conditions for legitimate humanitarian intervention laid out in The Responsibility to Protect.[15]

The painful events in Darfur-Sudan are a case in point. Since 2003 tens of thousands of people have been killed and hundreds of thousands have been driven from their homes by a government-backed militia. Advocates for intervention decry the loss of human life; they do not argue for intervention to protect the sovereignty of a state or to address a threat to international peace and security. Many governments and the United Nations (UN)

have echoed the concern, with the United States going so far as to officially accuse the Sudanese Government of genocide.[16] It is the first time in history that one government has accused another of ongoing genocide. At the same time, responses to the mass killing in Sudan have been wholly inadequate to protect civilians, as they were during the violence in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many other places of mayhem. The reluctance to act reflects the tension between the emerging norm of human security and the continued dominance of traditional security concerns, respect for state sovereignty, and a very practical recognition that stopping the killing is difficult and dangerous.

Today, many vicious and debilitating wars continue to occur, from Africa, across the Middle East and Central Eurasia, to South-East Asia. Most of them cause large-scale human suffering when rebel militia or government soldiers kill, rape and torture civilians and drive people from their homes and livelihoods. Given the ascendancy of human rights norms in international affairs, continual large-scale violence, the precedents of past interventions and available military capacity, it is reasonable to expect that political leaders will sometimes become concerned enough about the welfare of civilians to consider taking drastic action.[17] False humanitarian rhetoric must also be taken seriously. Abuse of the humanitarian justification for military action blurs the distinction between legitimate exceptions to the non-intervention principle and subversion of the principle for reasons of national interest.[18] If the allowable scope

for pursuing national interests through aggressive use of force expands, the international system is likely to become more dangerous and violent. Conversely, humanitarian intervention might be less likely in future situations where civilians truly need help if the claim of humanitarian motives is doubted because of past misuse of such a claim or if the action is not approved by the UN or another multilateral body. If there is a legitimate case for humanitarian intervention—and there is—such intervention must be strictly limited.

A man stands atop a building looking at the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, 2015. Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images

A better understanding of what constitutes legitimate humanitarian intervention will aid recognition of a wolf in sheep's clothing and help to maintain peace in international affairs. It is imperative that policymakers and the implementers of intervention—humanitarian workers, soldiers and civil servants—learn from the past. Humanitarian intervention is a dangerous and expensive enterprise. The mixed record of the past 15 years leaves enormous room for improvement, and there are no easy answers. The balance between political and humanitarian considerations is delicate; the relationship between military and civilian humanitarian

actors is both fragile and crucially important. If not done well, humanitarian intervention wastes lives and resources and might perpetuate or exacerbate the problems it is intended to address. At the moment, it can be said that humanitarian assistance feeds FMIs.[19]

A. The Syrian Civil War and the "Unwilling or Unable doctrine":

Since the start of the conflict in March 2011, the Syrian Civil War has become characterized by external intervention in support of belligerents both allied to, and fighting against the Assad regime. Amongst the numerous non-State actors involved are extremist groups internationally regarded as terrorist organizations, including ISIS and Khorasan Group.

Following the 'rapid territorial growth' of ISIS, in particular through the capture of Iraqi and Syrian territory in 2014, the US, together with Australia, Canada and the UK, began an aerial bombing campaign (hereafter 'Operation Inherent Resolve') targeting terrorist positions in Iraq following the Iraqi government's invitation. More contentiously, Operation Inherent Resolve also initiated strikes against terrorist positions within Syria without the consent of the Assad regime, while accepting it constitutes the Syrian government. The US has argued that it is entitled to take these steps on the basis of both the collective self-defense of Iraq against ISIS, as well as in individual self-defense. It has advanced an 'unwilling or unable' doctrine to support a claim to a right of self-defense

covering its conduct. A right to use necessary and proportionate force against terrorist groups is asserted as Syria is 'unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory' for terrorist attacks. For the Syrian government's part, it maintains that the US-led strikes are unlawful. It regards its consent as legally required for anti-terror activities on Syrian territory, and that effective steps to combat terrorism have been taken despite harmful external intervention.

It is useful to outline how unwilling or unable doctrine, if accepted in law, would alter the traditional12 scope of the 'inherent' customary international law right of States to self-defense in response to an 'armed attack', codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The two main distinguishing features entailed by the doctrine are: (i) a right to self-defense against non-State actors in the absence of State responsibility through 'effective control', and (ii) a right to pre-emptive self-defense. The States advocating the unwilling or unable doctrine claim a right to pre-emptive self-defense. In her letter to the Security Council setting out the doctrine, US Ambassador Power makes reference to the abstract 'threat' posed by terrorist groups, rather than claiming a right to self-defense in response to a specific armed attack.

The unwilling or unable doctrine has received explicit support from a number of States. Aside from the US, the other three States which were militarily involved in Operation Inherent Resolve strikes in Syria at its inception have also espoused the doctrine. Canada, which suspended its combat participation in favor of a support role against ISIS, did not do so out of any concern over Operation Inherent Resolve's legal basis – rather, the decision was based on domestic political concerns over the merits of military intervention generally. Alongside these four, Turkey has expressed support for the essentials of the doctrine in an Article 51 letter to the Security Council reporting its own use of force in self-defense against ISIS in Syria, albeit using a marginally different formulation describing the Syrian government as 'neither capable of nor willing'. In opposition, some States have joined Syria in explicitly rejecting the doctrine's status in law, Russia doing so along with Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela.

Many States sought to reaffirm generally traditional State sovereignty after airstrikes began, in line with an orthodox, wide reading of the UN Charter's Article 2 (Clause 4) prohibition on the use of force. For example, China highlighted that it was 'imperative to consistently comply with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the basic norms governing international relations, while maintaining the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria'. Angola and Kazakhstan also made statements to that effect. Others placed emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation to combat terrorism, seemingly implying a contrast with the contentious route taken by Operation Inherent Resolve. These include Belarus, Brazil, Chad, India, South Africa, and the ten States of the Association of South East Asian Nations.

As such, it is sound to conclude that the unwilling or unable doctrine, at least in respect of its latest application in Syria, has not been accepted by the international community so as to amount to 'settled practice' to widen the concept of armed attack and the right to self-defense.

The committee should be aware of the current scenarios and must build solutions that can be applied realistically to cases such as the above mentioned. The case study regarding the situation in Syria should not limit your research. There are other cases like the humanitarian situation in Somalia or the improvement of nuclear security in Iran. Remember that what makes a diplomat a good one is the capacity to set his/her mind in a global arena.

IV. PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS:

Remember that foreign military interventions have existed since ancient times. From the Age of Exploration in the 1500s to the World Wars in the 1900s, FMIs have been part of our own human nature of attack and defense. Indeed, the World Wars were the ones who had the greatest impact as they incentivized new military technology and changed the way countries saw the effectiveness of foreign military interventions. At that point, FMIs were not just matters of domestic national politics but rather started to gain support from international organizations.

U.S. President George H. W. Bush greets Somali women and children while visiting U.S. troops in Somalia on January 2, 1993, to help the population deal with a devastating famine.
RICK WILKING/REUTERS

As part of past international actions, we can look at how the United Nations developed their Peacekeeping Operations. Born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles.

As the Cold War ended, there was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping missions. With a new consensus and a common sense of purpose, the Security Council authorized a total of 20 operations between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. Some of these missions were deployed to help implement peace agreements that had ended long-drawn-out conflicts – in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Cambodia – and to help the countries stabilize, re-organize, elect new governments and build democratic institutions. However, other missions were

established in situations where the guns had not yet fallen silent and in areas such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda where there was no peace to keep. These three high-profile peacekeeping operations came under criticism as peacekeepers faced situations where warring parties failed to adhere to peace agreements, or the peacekeepers themselves were not provided adequate resources or political support. As civilian casualties rose, and hostilities continued, the reputation of United Nations peacekeeping plummeted. While problems with military interventions started to thrive, this didn't stop countries from sending troops as a matter of aid for FMIs.

USA covert actions in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan GLOBAL RESEARCH

After recognizing the setbacks and with a greater understanding of the limits – and potential – of UN peacekeeping, the United Nations was asked to perform even more complex tasks starting in 1999. The UN served as the administrator of the territories of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia, and East Timor (now Timor-Leste), which was in the process of gaining independence from Indonesia. In both situations, the UN was widely viewed as the only organization with the globally-recognized credibility and impartiality to take on the job - and we hope this still maintains within the committee.[21] Since the 21st century, FMIs

are not just gaining more military support but also, they are subject to political objectives in the benefit of the populations. Sometimes, these objectives are modified indiscriminately according to each type of conflict and regarding nations' personal agendas.

On the other hand, another key past international action is the Responsibility to Protect. R2P, as it's commonly known, is a set of principles based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility. It is a doctrine that first obligates individual states and then the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P has only been discussed in the 2005 World Summit, and the Resolution in the UN was voted and approved but only by a small margin .[22]

V. TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

In the following lines, you will have a timeline of the most significant military interventions[23] that have impacted the course of our lives:

Grenada: In October 1983, the United States led a military invasion of Grenada, a tiny Caribbean island nation, after a bloody coup ousted the government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, who was assassinated. President Ronald Reagan was said to have been concerned about a 10,000-foot-long airstrip that the communist country's military was building, which he thought would enable planes loaded with arms from Cuba to reach

insurgents in Central America. The administration was also concerned about the safety of 800 American medical students studying in Grenada.

Panama: In December 1989, the United States invaded Panama with more than 27,000 troops. The operation lasted just over a month, resulting in the defeat of the Panamanian forces. Panama's leader, Manuel Noriega, was overthrown during the invasion, and a new president was sworn in.

Iraq: After Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. When the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal expired, the United States started a massive aerial war that drove Hussein's forces out of Kuwait. U.S.-led coalition forces advanced well into Iraqi territory.

Somalia: In June 1993, the United Nations passed a resolution declaring war on Mohamed Farah Aideed and his militia, after Aideed ordered an attack on a Pakistani force that was part of the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which worked to monitor a cease-fire in the Somali capital and protect humanitarian supplies and convoys. Starting in August 1993, U.S. troops attacked various targets in Mogadishu to find Aideed. The operation ended in October, after a bloody overnight standoff later known as "Black Hawk Down," referring to the downing of two UH-60 helicopters by Aideed's men.

Afghanistan and Sudan: After the bombings of its embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania, the United States in August 1998 launched cruise missiles at four terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in an attempt to assassinate Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. The United States also dropped missiles on a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, claiming it was helping bin Laden build chemical weapons.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: In March 1999, NATO began strategic airstrikes in Kosovo and Serbia because then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was continuing to persecute ethnic Albanians in Kosovo who were organizing mass protests against Serbian rule. After several weeks of bombing, the Yugoslav forces agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and Milosevic accepted an international peace plan to end the fighting.

Afghanistan: After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States launched a war in Afghanistan, attacking al-Qaeda forces and the Taliban, which was hosting al-Qaeda's leadership in the country. After removing the Taliban from power, the United States and its allies took control of several parts of the country and have since been fighting the insurgents. Two months after the U.S.-led attack, the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force to oversee security and train Afghan forces.

Iraq: In March 2003, President George W. Bush announced a war against Iraq, saying its goal was to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction" and remove Saddam

Hussein from power. U.S. forces launched airstrikes on Baghdad, then began a ground invasion of the city that quickly lead to the collapse of Hussein's rule. The United States formally pulled out of Iraq in late 2011.

Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen: Since 2002, the United States has regularly used armed Predator drones to target and kill terrorists inside Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The strikes have more than doubled under President Obama, who has expanded the scope and intensity of the drone campaign against militants in the Middle East and Africa. The United Nations has criticized the drone tactics, saying the United States has disregarded the threat of civilian casualties from its aerial operations.

Libya: In March 2011, France and Britain led, with U.S. assistance, a military operation in Libya, conducting airstrikes against Libyan army installations and air-defence systems, and imposing a no-fly zone. The NATO mission in Libya ended shortly after the death of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.

War in Yugoslavia Peace Movement SPIEGEL ONLINE

VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:

Using military force to save lives is difficult, dangerous, rarely politically rewarding—and yet somehow here to stay.

Presidents, UN organs, and the population will almost always want to do something when thousands or tens of thousands of innocent people are dying as a result of the war. But dozens of civil wars are being waged around the world at any given time; demands being made on armed forces already verge on being excessive, and conducting successful interventions is difficult.[24] Therefore, it's imperative to notice that each such decision requires answering three crucial questions:

A. When and where should we intervene?

Given the many conflicts in the world today, the answer is to focus on those where the scale of death and suffering is greatest, where intervention is unlikely to create great-power conflicts, and where a mission can be designed that promises many lives saved at low cost. It's important to notice that the prevalence and intensity of civil conflict are not increasing as a result of the end of the Cold War, globalization, or anything else. Of the many civil wars around the world, most are not especially violent. Their per capita death rates, for example, are not notably worse than murder rates in U.S. cities. That is not to say we should ignore these conflicts—only that the blunt, dangerous, and expensive instrument of forcible military intervention should not be applied in most instances.

In the 1990s, ten conflicts were extremely lethal: those in Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Chechnya. These should have been the prime

candidates for humanitarian intervention, as should any future conflicts of comparable severity. But it would not have been wise to intervene in all ten, which brings us to the second criterion for intervention. Notably, intervening in Chechnya was and is simply out of the question, given Russia's size and nuclear weapons capability. In North Korea, where not war but severe repression and misgovernment, joined with starvation, caused at least hundreds of thousands of deaths last decade, an intervention was also impractical given the North's ability to retaliate and cause at least tens of thousands of casualties in South Korea. Likewise, a hypothetical intervention in Kashmir would be unthinkable without the permission of India and Pakistan. And similar considerations rule out any forceful military mission to protect Tibet from Chinese oppression.

B. How should we intervene?

Simply deciding to intervene is not enough. Using the force the wrong way can exacerbate some conflicts and get a lot of people, including troops, killed as well. Sometimes, however, as in Kosovo, insisting on a precise itinerary of intervention and a concrete political end-state for the region before becoming involved would be counterproductive. But at a minimum, the international community needs some sense of how it will apply military force before intervening. Should it simply do enough to feed starving people, should it create safe havens for individuals or groups at risk, should it impose a ceasefire line between warring parties—or might it even help one side to win a conflict?

It all depends. Where tens of thousands are at risk from war-related famine, disease, or exposure, simply setting up protected humanitarian zones may make sense. That is particularly the case when, as in Somalia in the early 1990s, the conflict that has produced the problem seems severe and intractable.

We should even be willing to take sides when one party to a conflict is clearly the better choice for its own country and when taking sides is likely to end a conflict. For example, had the global community been willing to step up its involvement in Rwanda in 1994, it would have been wisest to ally with the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front against the Hutu-led armed forces that, in league with various militia groups, ultimately carried out that country's terrible genocide.

What about the future? The world's most severe conflicts today include those in Sierra Leone, Congo, Angola, Iran, Venezuela, and India-Pakistan. Intervention in the last three would pit outside forces against battle-toughened, dedicated, and rather large insurgencies fighting on terrain advantageous for guerrilla-like warfare. Those are the situations nations should generally avoid since they are likely to inflict substantial casualties on intervening troops.

C. Who is entitled to intervene?

Saving lives is not a uniquely American interest. And the United States,

alone among the major western powers, already maintains high military vigilance in the Persian Gulf and the Korean peninsula.

Unfortunately, other countries, in general, have neither the forcible entry capabilities nor the sustainable logistics to intervene in distant lands to save lives. Australia has done most of the work in East Timor, and our European allies have provided the vast majority of troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, of late. But U.S. capabilities are generally needed, at least initially, in the face of the armed opposition.

Other countries have much more work to do. The European allies, Canada, and even Japan should improve their ability to move troops to distant combat zones. Among the major western European nations, the model for improving peace operations and forcible intervention capabilities is clear. In a word, it is Britain. Its military is smaller than that of France or Germany but much more useful beyond its own borders. It can deploy perhaps 50,000 combat troops, with air support, well beyond its territory within three to four months and sustain them there for months. Because the European Union cannot be expected in the near term to act as a single entity in matters of war and peace, the most realistic alternative is for several countries or subgroups of countries each to have the capacity for meaningful military action abroad on their own or as coalitions of the willing.

Were Germany and Japan to follow the above prescriptions, their neighbors might be highly agitated, worrying about their capacity for autonomous power projection. The simplest way to defuse—or at least contain—such concerns is to begin with modest military ambitions for those two cases. Deploying troops only under multilateral, and preferably UN, auspices would further reassure nervous neighbors.

What about non-Western countries? Expensive hardware such as airlift capabilities, helicopters, and fighter aircraft, especially in large numbers, will generally be beyond their means. It is more realistic to ask these countries to develop well-trained soldiers, proficient in basic combat and peacekeeping skills, and equipped with serviceable small arms, body armor, vehicles for transport, and logistics and communications support for sustained operations abroad. Even if such countries cannot be expected to lead forcible interventions, they can provide valuable combat forces that enable peacekeeping missions to uphold ceasefires and peace accords under challenge.

Again, the focus should be on improving individual countries' military capacities, so that they can deploy as ad hoc coalitions, rather than depending on unanimous participation from all members of regional security groups to carry out missions. Regional institutions are useful for negotiating peace accords and politically legitimating interventions, but not for owning or maintaining actual military forces-at least not yet.

We hope that by answering these questions carefully—and by trying to

develop more global capacity for conducting peace and humanitarian operations—the international community can significantly reduce violence around the world in the years ahead.

VII. BLOC POSITIONS:

As previously stated, neither every country has forcible entry capabilities nor sustainable logistics to intervene in distant lands to develop a successful foreign military intervention. Hence, bloc positions would be considered in this case regarding two main factors: 1) The economic and technological military capabilities of nations & 2) The nation's willingness to intervene militarily.

Countries with military capabilities and willingness to intervene: Both the Russian Federation and the United States of America are the main players regarding foreign military interventions. Since the Cold War, the world was aligned into two poles - just remember the famous phrase from Winston Churchill that an "iron curtain" had descended across Europe. It is true that both Russia and the U.S. share characteristics in common and are always present whenever a conflict is to be solved. Countries that belong to this category are needed initially in the face of the armed opposition and will need to contribute troops to postwar missions in order to maintain influence.

Countries with only military capabilities: Canada, China, Japan and the major western European nations - France, Germany, United Kingdom - share the same category. All of them are high-income countries with sufficient military technology; however, they should improve their ability to move troops to distant combat zones. It is recommended that for having a major distribution of forces in a global level, these countries should scale their efforts to some extent proportionately or band together in subgroups with each country developing specific duties in FMIs.

Countries with neutral stances: In this category, we have the countries that depending on their location, budgets, and interests will define their positions in the usage of FMIs. In most cases, these nations will provide aid with well-trained soldiers, proficient in basic combat and peacekeeping skills, and equipped with serviceable small arms, body armor, vehicles for transport, and logistics and communications support for sustained operations abroad. For example, members of the Group of Lima such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru fall under this category. Also, programs like the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) should not only be continued but expanded dramatically.

Countries with negative thoughts on military interventions: According to the Global Conflict Tracker, there are currently 26 ongoing conflicts in the world. Usually, the countries that are subject to an internal conflict are the ones who doubt the effectiveness of FMIs and are, in most cases, worried about countries' real interests. In this category, we can have Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, among others. It would depend on

delegations falling in this category whether to believe in FMIs and work in collaboration with countries that have those capabilities.

VIII. QARMAs:

For a Resolution to be accepted, it has, at its minimum, to deal with the following issues:

1. Considering the consequences Foreign Military Interventions (FMIs) have yielded around history, are these operations yet justified to be used in current situations? If so, how can we determine their effectiveness and what mechanisms can be developed to solve this issue?

2. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has played an important role in the last decades of military interventions, but considering that it's not a binding concept, it's still opened to a lot of criticism and that military technologies and national interests have evolved over time, how can the United Nations still assure that this principle is accomplished with complete transparency? Is it necessary that someone should supervise each intervention like in the case of Peacekeeping operations?

3. The international community has already agreed that Humanitarian Interventions are somehow legal. Nonetheless, with more engaging protocols like the R2P and the "Unable or Unwilling" Doctrine, how can governments assure that interventions around the world are clearly and legally justifiable? Is the presence of a third-actor relevant and if so, who will be this mediator?

4. With so many countries that are currently facing difficult challenges in the domestic level, how can the Disarmament and International Security Committee manage FMIs if the countries in conflict do not trust certain foreign states? Will the principle of sovereignty prevail or be ignored? Are humanitarian military interventions a real justification in these matters?

5. Under the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council is the only organ that can order a military intervention in a certain region in the globe. If there is an ongoing crisis that urges an immediate intervention and the UNSC fails to reach a consensus, how will nations align to solve the issue? Will they act under Chapter VII of the Charter by themselves or will they maintain neutral for an undefined period of time?

6. Throughout history, we've seen several missions regarding military interventions. From victories to defeats, how can we consider an intervention a successful one? Are there certain parameters any mission should fulfil, before, during, and after its mandate?

Which interventions can we cite as models for future operations?

7. There are countries with the power to aid every region in the world. There are others with limited resources that can just manage their own national issues. As DISEC is a committee with so many policies that can be shaped and with so many backgrounds that should be respected, how will nations manage to create long-lasting solutions if consensus and dialogue are non-existing? How can your domestic interests be represented in the geopolitics of today?

8. What role does the international community play in the establishment of FMIs? Should their establishment require international approval or with an agreement among the parties would be enough? Is the creation of an international authority independent from the United Nations necessary?

IX. CONFERENCE PREPARATION:

As a former Secretary-General of CarMUN, I understand how engaged and passionate the delegates regarding conferences with liberal environments are. This year, the conference's theme is based on prejudice and discrimination, which have been the root causes of many human conflicts in history. When talking about the conference preparation, I consider that procedural, substantive, and skill-based indicators are the most important things to remember before your arrival at CarMUN.

A. Procedural Preparation: In order to perform in committee, delegates must have an understanding of the basic structural elements of MUN. CarMUN emphasizes the useful application of rules to promote the smooth functioning of the committee. It is important for delegates to understand the rules because they enhance committee and the learning experience of the delegate. To prevent misunderstandings and delays, a comprehensive understanding of the rules and their use is vital. Additionally, delegates can use an understanding of the rules to advance their own policies in committee. For example, in DISEC, the speakers' list can become quite long, and a delegate may have to wait for an hour or more before it is their turn to speak. However, by using the rules governing yielded time, questions, and comments from the floor, a delegate can speak far more frequently. Knowledge of the rules is an important tool to allow you to air your views productively and efficiently. At the conference, you may clarify issues of procedure and debate with the committee staff through points of parliamentary inquiry. Although it is important to read and understand the full Rules of Procedure, please note that as the director, I will have the final discretion over debate structure and procedure.

B. Substantive Preparation: Once delegates understand the rules of the committee, they should learn how to contribute substantially to the debate. Substantive preparation, the process by which delegates learn how their ideas can make a difference in the committee, is a three-step process. First, delegates should

research their committee and its place in the UN system and the international framework. By knowing the powers and duties of their committee, delegates can get a sense of what types of solutions will and will not be possible. Delegates should then master the topic that their committee will discuss. Although the background guide provides a strong foundation of information on the topics, it is essential that delegates build on this foundation with their own research and critical thinking. Lastly, delegates should learn their country's policy on the topics being addressed, so that they can represent their country strongly and accurately.

C. Skills-based Preparation: Beyond mastering Model UN procedure and substance, a good delegate also looks to refine their skills. Strong public speaking, negotiating, collaboration, writing, and research skills are all part of an excellent delegate's toolbox. Prior to coming to CarMUN, delegates should look to practice these skills. There are plenty of online resources that may be helpful in this pursuit, and also you can practice a lot through your MUN club meetings. It is important to note that participating in CarMUN itself will also help you to expand and refine your skill sets.

D. Position papers: Each delegation must turn in a position paper before the start of the conference to rllontop001@gmail.com. The purpose of a position paper is to give each delegation the chance to summarize its understanding of the issue at hand, to delineate a nation's stance on the issue, and to propose possible solutions that could be debated in committee. When

writing your position papers, there is a simple format that you should stick to; it will make it easier for you to write and for us to read:

Header: This section should outline the delegate's or delegates' committee, topic, country, name and school.

First paragraph: Discussion of the problem at hand and of national policies towards the issue. Delegates should include a substantial amount of information and analysis on the problem at hand, its causes, implications and consequences at the global and, more importantly, the national level. This section should answer questions like what has your country done towards this issue? Have they implemented any laws, national initiatives, measures? Where they effective? How? It is important to show statistics because they show the reality of your country.

*Second paragraph***:** Discussion of international past actions. This section should include the most relevant past actions taken by the UN, international organizations or other countries regarding the issue and whether their nation has supported them. Delegates should also analyze their successes and shortcomings. This section should answer questions like which resolutions have my country supported? How have they been crucial in the matter to be discussed?

Third paragraph: Discussion of solutions. This is the most critical part of the position paper and should be the lengthiest and most detailed. Delegates should focus on

the most impactful solutions they will propose in committee and detail how they will be implemented and funded. Delegates could also suggest how they would plan to build support for their solutions in committee. In this part, questions to be answered could be what should we propose? When and where? How is it going to work? Who will oversee the results?

When writing, make sure to use the third person if representing a nation, and aim to search for substantial amount of new information instead of repeating what is outlined in the background guide. Please note that delegates should reference all sources used in their position papers and that plagiarism will not be tolerated. All position papers should be written in Times New Roman 11-point font, single-spaced, and no more than one page in length.

X. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

Foreign Military Interventions can be a challenging topic to address in just this length of pages. Therefore, we think you can find really useful to continue your research by using the following materials:

"Humanitarian Military Intervention: The conditions for success and failure" by Taylor B. Seybolt: The book focuses on the questions of when and how military intervention in conflicts can achieve humanitarian benefits. It argues that an intervention can be justified only when decision-makers are reasonably sure that it will do more good than harm. As the measure of success, the book's analysis of 17 military operations in the defining cases of the 1990s—Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor—reveals both successful and unsuccessful interventions in the same locations. The book posits that an intervention's short-term effectiveness depends primarily on factors within the control of the intervener, rather than factors inherent to the conflict. Taylor Seybolt combines political and humanitarian dimensions to create a typology that compares the needs of populations suffering from conflict with an intervener's military strategies, motives, capabilities and response time. It's an amazing book that has been useful for our team in the development of this guide.

The Global Conflict Tracker by the Council on Foreign Relations: The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States and its allies. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict. If you want to revise how might a conflict be resolved or if the current solutions are working, do not hesitate to check out this page.

XI. COMMITTEE'S EXPECTATIONS:

As previously stated, this will be my last time as a director. Hence, I hope delegates can show their full potential and, above all, enjoy a conference that has so much to offer. First, I would like to share a brief overview of a tentative schedule we

have regarding each committee session. We will begin our first session on Friday afternoon with preliminary announcements, opening the debate, Speaker's List, one/two moderated caucuses and one unmoderated caucus. On Saturday morning, you should finish drafting your Working Papers while debating on substantive points regarding the topic area. That same day, you should introduce working papers, begin drafting resolutions, and refining debate on action items for the topic area. Lastly, on Sunday you should deliver your Draft Resolutions really early, then we will proceed with the presentations and voting procedures. I hope we can have some time for superlatives or maybe a colloquium, it all depends on you!

On the other hand, as DISEC is a double-delegation committee, during moderated caucuses I expect to have one delegate engaging in debate inside the committee room, while their partner is working outside - obviously, this might not apply in every moment, but I hope you can remember it. It's important to bear in mind that CarMUN endorses the rule that one delegate per delegation must be in the committee room at all times. Furthermore, from personal experiences I know that the demands of a resolution committee lead delegates to spend time outside of the session working on committee-related matters, namely drafting or merging working papers and draft resolutions. I would just like to clarify that any work done outside of the committee session is entirely unsupervised and done at the will of each delegate.

Lastly, I would like to point out I love enthusiastic speakers. Every delegate should be able to deliver any kind of speech, but always the energy and emotion when doing so need to be really high. I liked when delegates feel the speech, feel the words they're saying and belief in themselves with passion. Also, I will expect you to bring new things into debate. This means that instead of just repeating the same ideas in every moderated caucus, I would like to see when a delegate shifts the committee into new subtopics to debate and thus, the committee follows his/her perspective. When delivering speeches, please remember to have an introduction, a body, and a conclusion. Bring me facts and try to use cause-effect speeches when talking about any solutions you might want to present. I do like quantity, but it would be better if you have one main idea in each of your speeches for the rest to understand it. On the other hand, remember that what makes a good delegate is his/her capacity to listen to the ideas of the others. Therefore, I would like to see you negotiating with everyone, not just a specific group of people. Furthermore, try to use the things you have discussed during negotiations when delivering speeches. This makes me understand how you are working with the other delegations and is useful for telling details I as the chair may not have seen. Lastly, I would love to see a big smile on each of your faces at any moment and please, always be diplomatic.

Without further ado, I hope you have enjoyed this background guide as much as we have during the research period. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact us, we will be happy to

answer you. See you in October, and remember "We All Have the Power to Change the World".

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